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than extradition which connotes dealings between independent nations. 2 Moore, Extradition (i8gi), i ff. The duty of rendition is absolute, and the governor of the asylum
state has no discretion in the matter once the act of Congress, 18 U.S.C. § 662 (1926),
has been complied with. Ky. v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66 (i86o); Johnston v. Riley, 13 Ga.
97 (185j); In re opinion of Justices to Governorand Council, 201 Mass. 6og, 89 N.E. 174
(igog); Ex parte Graves, 236 Mass. 493, 128 N.E. 867 (1920); In re Panmore, 96 N.J.
Eq. 397, 125 At. 926 (1924); People v. Moore, 217 N.Y. 632, 112 N.E. 1070 (1916);
People v. Pinkerton, 17 Hun. ig (N.Y. 1879); Ex parte Van Vleck, 6 Ohio Dec. 636
(1878). Upon the "theory of discretion" however, it is asserted by some authority, judicial and legislative, that the duty to render is not absolute. State v. Eberstein,1O5 Neb.
833, 182 N.W. 500 (1921); see Mass. Pub. Statutes 1882, c. 177 and Mass. Gen. Laws
1932, c. 226, §§ 12, 13, authorizing the attorney general to advise or give opinion as to
the "legality or expediency" of complying with the demand for the fugitive; case of
Kimpton (1878) discussed in Moore, op. cit., 613. Since, by the weight of authority, the
duty of rendition is absolute and ministerial in nature, it must follow that once the
extradition warrant has been issued it cannot be revoked except in the case of a defective requisition. Hosmer v. Loveland, i Barb. iii (N.Y. 1854). The court in the instant case leans toward the minority view for it rests its decision in part upon State v.
Toole, 69 Minn. 104, 72 N.W. 53, 38 L.R.A. 224 (1897) which in turn relied upon
Work v. Corrington,34 Ohio St. 64,32 Am. Rep. 345 (1877). It was stated in the latter
case that the power of revocation was not limited to cases where the requisition was in-.
sufficient on its face. See also State v. Eberstein,supra;Moore, op. cit., supra, § 620. It
would seem that the power to revoke a warrant cannot exist when there does not also
exist the power to exercise discretion in its issuance. Hosmer v. Loveland, supra.
Though the governor of the asylum state is under a positive "duty" to deliver up a
fugitive, it is certain the federal judiciary will not order him to perform it. Ky. v. Dennison, supra. As was expressed in Ex parte Virginia, 1OO U.S. 339 (1879) concerning
the rendition section of the Constitution, Art. 4, § 2, it "is only declaratory of the
moral duty of the state" with no power of enforcement by the central government. An
anomaly and a legal impasse result: a "duty" that cannot be enforced and a "right"
without a remedy.
NEWELL A. CLA.P

Insurance-Duty Arising from Life Insurance Application-[Federal].-Plaintiffs, as
executors of applicant for life insurance, petitioned to recover damages from the defendant in tort on the ground of failure to act on the application within a reasonable time.
The deceased had made an advance payment of the required premium and had satisfactorily passed a medical examination. The plaintiffs asserted that the defendant had
neither accepted nor rejected the application dated February i, 1932 prior to the applicant's death on April 7, 1932. Upon notice of the death the defendant stated that the
application had been declined March 1, 1932. Defendant demurred. Held, demurrer
sustained. Munger el al.v. EquitableLife Assur. Soc. of the United States, 2 F. Supp. 914
(D.C. W. D. Mo., 1933).
Contrary to the orthodox basis of liability in reference to insurance contracts, the
theory asserted in the petitition was that an unreasonable delay in declining the appli-

RECENT CASES
cation is a breach of duty owing an applicant for insurance which subjects the company
to liability in tort. Such theory of tort liability is relatively novel in the law, inasmuch
as insurance contracts have been written for centuries and relatively few cases have
caused this basis of liability to be adjudicated. While the petition cites many of the
cases of this nature, four undertake to demonstrate the pre-existing legal duty, none of
which were controlling in the jurisdiction of the court.
Briefly they state the insurer's liability arises: (i) from the equitable principle that
that which ought to have been done will be considered as having been done, Carterv.
Life Ins. Co., ii Hawaii 69 (1897); (2) from the fact that insurance companies have a
franchise from the state which was granted in the public interest; (3) from the fact that
insurance companies impliedly agree to act honestly and fairly on applications submitted to them; (4) from the fact that where there has been an advance payment of the
premium that an unreasonable delay in acting is a breach of the trust, in which the
premium is held, Ditffie v. Bankers' Life Ass'n., 16o Iowa i, 139 N.W. 1087 (1913);
(5) from the fact that "some kind of a consensual relationship" has been entered into
by the applicant and the company, Kukuska v. InsuranceCo., 204 Wis. 166, 235 N.W.
4o3 (1g31); (6), from the value of the risk; (7) from the fact that the insurance company, having pre-empted the field, should not retain control of the situation and the
applicant's funds indefinitely, Strand v. Bankers' Life Ins. Co., 115 Neb. 357, 213 N.W.
349 (1927).
Until the application is accepted by the insurer, a promise to pay or payment is
conditional upon the acceptance, and the application is still no more than a proposition
to take and to pay for insurance should the company accept. The payment of the premium when the ipplication is signed does not bind the company to accept his terms,
and of course the applicant may recover the payment upon rejection. These are fundamental rules of the law of contracts which cannot be ignored. But the immediate inquiry is whether or not a decision against the insurance company because of alleged unreasonable delay in rejecting the application or serving notice of such rejection should
expose it to tort liability. Arkansas, as well as the instant case, has flatly rejected the
doctrine of tort liability. National UnionFire Ins. Co. v. School Dist., 122 Ark. 179, 182
S.W. 547, L.R.A. 1916D, 238 (r916). Illinois has refused recovery although judgment
was for the defendant solely on the ground that under the facts of the case the applicant's administrator had no right of action. Bradley v.Fed.Life Ins. Co., 295 Ill. 381, 129
N.E. 171, 15 A.L.R. 1021 (1920). See also Savage v. Insurance Co., 154 Miss. 89, 121
So. 487 (1929); Thornton v. NationalCouncil, etc., rio W.Va. 412, 158 S.E. 507 (1931).
The present case indicates the rise of a comparatively new social problem, the issue
being, simply, whether or not the courts should recognize a duty on the part of insurance companies to reasonably act on insurance applications. See generally for the judicial technique in handling this sort of issue in other types of tort cases Green, The
Duty Problem, 28 Col. L. Rev. 1014 (1928), 29 Col. L. Rev. 255 (1929). Moreover, the
tendency in these cases seems to be to shift wherever possible the burden of loss due to
accident or catastrophe from the shoulders of the individual to those of the community
or of a group of the community. Funk, Duty of Insurer to Act Promptly on Insurance
Applications, 75 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 207 (1926). See also Vance, Insurance (2nd ed.
1930) 19o if.
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